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Convexity in Stochastic Cooperative Situations∗
Judith Timmer1,2 Peter Borm2 Stef Tijs2
Abstract
This paper introduces a new model concerning cooperative situations in which the payoffs are
modeled by random variables. We analyze these situations by means of cooperative games with
random payoffs. Special attention is paid to three types of convexity, namely coalitional-merge,
individual-merge and marginal convexity. The relations between these types are studied and in
particular, as opposed to their deterministic counterparts for TU games, we show that these three
types of convexity are not equivalent. However, all types imply that the core of the game is nonempty.
Sufficient conditions on the preferences are derived such that the Shapley value, defined as the average
of the marginal vectors, is an element of the core of a convex game.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification Number: 91A12.
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1 Introduction
In many real-life situations payoffs to agents are uncertain. For example, consider two firms who will
temporarily be working together in an R&D project. The profit of this project is yet uncertain, but
the firms sign a contract beforehand in which their profit shares are written down. Another situation
with uncertain payoffs is the following. Consider two musicians, a pianist and a violinist. Each of them
has a contract with a hotel to give small performances. Their payoffs consist of a small wage and the
tips they receive during their performances. At the end of the month their contracts will end and both
their employers offer them a new contract with the same conditions. Until now these musicians always
performed separately, although recently they started studying some pieces for violin and piano together.
This is because they found a (third) hotel that is willing to contract both of them. This contract says
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that both musicians only perform for this hotel and their individual payoffs consist of a small wage. Ten
percent of all the tips they receive during their performances will be for the hotel and the remaining 90
percent will be divided among the pianist and the violinist. Before the end of the month the musicians
have to decide whether to cooperate or not. In both cases their payoffs will be uncertain because they
depend on the uncertain amount of tips to be received during performances.
In ’classical’ cooperative game theory, payoffs to coalitions of agents are known with certainty. Therefore,
situations with uncertain payoffs in which the agents cannot await the realizations of these payoffs,
cannot be modeled according to this theory. In this paper we study situations with random payoffs
from a game-theoretical point of view that is close to classical cooperative game theory.
In the literature one can find a few other models that can handle uncertain payoffs, for example Charnes
and Granot (1973) and Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere and Tijs (1999). Charnes and Granot
(1973) introduced games in stochastic characteristic function form. These are games where the payoff
to coalition S, V (S), is allowed to be a random variable. To allocate the payoff of the grand coalition
to the players, the authors suggest a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, so called prior-payoffs are
promised to the agents. These prior-payoffs are determined such that there is a relatively high chance
that the promises can be realized. In the second stage the realizations of the payoffs are awaited and,
if necessary, the prior-payoff vector has to be adjusted to this realization. Research on this subject was
continued in Charnes and Granot (1976, 1977) and Granot (1977). Some disadvantages of their
model are the assumptions that players have to be risk-neutral and that the realizations of the payoffs
can be awaited.
In Suijs and Borm (1999) a different model is studied. They consider a set AS of actions that coalition
S can take. The stochastic value of this coalition then depends on which action a ∈ AS is chosen and
is denoted by XS(a). An allocation of XS(a) to the members of coalition S is described as the sum of
two parts. The first part is a monetary transfer between the agents and the second part is an allocation
of fractions of XS(a). Work on this model was started in Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere and Tijs
(1999) and an application in insurance can be found in Suijs, De Waegenaere and Borm (1998).
In this paper we introduce a model that, when compared to the previous two models, looks the most
like the model of Suijs et al. but there are some major differences. One of these is that allocations of
random payoffs are defined differently. In the model of Suijs et al. only fractions (i.e. multiples m with
0 ≤ m ≤ 1) of the random payoffs are allowed while in our model allocations may be any multiples
of the random payoffs, including negative ones as well as multiples larger than 1. A second difference
is caused by our focus on allocations of uncertainty only and therefore we do not allow for monetary
compensations to cover risk, as opposed to the Suijs et al. model. This prevents the players to act like
little insurance companies as was a typical feature of the Suijs et al. model. This alternative view may
lead to broader insights in how uncertainty can be dealt with. Further, upon considering only multiples
of the random payoffs and thus not allowing arbitrary divisions, the type of the underlying probability
distribution will remain the same. Finally, this type of allocation is close to that of classical TU games
since there an allocation can also be written in terms of multiples of the payoff of the grand coalition.
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In this paper special attention will be paid to convexity in cooperative situations with uncertain payoffs.
We define three types of convexity for games corresponding to these situations. The definitions of these
types are based on three equivalent formulations of convexity for TU games based on marginalistic
interpretations. For NTU games the supermodular interpretation of TU convexity was extended to
ordinal convexity and cardinal convexity, introduced in Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981), respec-
tively. More recently, Suijs (1999) and Hendrickx, Borm and Timmer (2002) introduce other types
of convexity for NTU games that are based on the formulations of convexity for TU games involving
notions of marginal contributions.
The three types of convexity to be introduced are coalitional-merge convexity, individual-merge convex-
ity and marginal convexity. The first two are based on the marginal contributions of a coalition of agents
and a single agent, respectively, while the third type, marginal convexity, is based on whether or not all
the marginal vectors belong to the core of the game. We show that coalitional-merge convexity implies
individual-merge convexity, which in turn implies marginal convexity. Examples show that the reverse
relations need not hold. Further, each marginal convex game has a nonempty core as well as each of
its subgames. Besides, we extend the definition of the Shapley value for TU games as the average of
the marginal vectors to our class of cooperative games with random payoffs. We show that the Shapley
value is an element of the core of a marginal convex game for certain types of preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Allocations of random variables and the preference
relations of the agents over these allocations are defined in section 2. After this, we give a formal
description of our model in section 3 and we extend several basic notions from deterministic TU games,
like allocations, imputations, superadditivity, the core and marginal vectors, to our model. In section 4
we introduce and study the three types of convexity as discussed above. As opposed to deterministic
TU games, we show that these types are not equivalent. However, they all imply that the core of the
game is nonempty and for certain types of preferences this core contains the Shapley value.
2 Allocations and preferences in games with random payoffs
Let (Ω,F , IP) be a probability space, where Ω is the outcome space, F is a σ-algebra in Ω and IP is
a probability measure on F . A stochastic variable X is a measurable function that assigns to each
outcome ω ∈ Ω a real number X(ω). The set of all stochastic variables X with a finite expectation
is denoted by L and L+ is the set of all nonnegative stochastic variables in L. By 0 we denote the
stochastic variable that takes the value zero for sure. Note that 0 ∈ L+.
A deterministic cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU game, is described by a pair (N, v)
where N is the set of players. A nonempty set of players is called a coalition and v : 2N → IR is
the characteristic function assigning to each coalition S a value v(S) and v(∅) = 0. If we introduce
uncertainty into this model, such that coalitions of players do not know for sure what payoff they will
receive, then the payoffs will be random variables. Denote by R(S) the stochastic payoff (reward) in
L+ to coalition S and let R = {R(S)|S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅} be the set of all these payoffs; R(∅) will not be
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defined. For a coalition S, an allocation (in terms) of R(S) is a vector of multiples of R(S). If p ∈ IRS
is an allocation for S then player i ∈ S receives piR(S). Such an allocation is efficient if
∑
i∈S pi = 1.
For ease of notation define ∆∗(S) = {p ∈ IRS |
∑
i∈S pi = 1}. Allocations as defined here can be used in
any situation with (nonnegative) random payoffs where one is interested in the division of some payoff
among the participants.
Now that we know how the payoffs of the coalitions can be allocated, it is time to see how players
compare two stochastic payoffs. First we restrict ourselves to random payoffs unequal to 0 (random
payoffs that do not take the value 0 for sure), or nonzero random payoffs in short, and after that we
include 0 as a payoff. Let A = {S ⊂ N |S 6= ∅, R(S) 6= 0} be the set of all coalitions with nonzero
payoffs. Because allocations are multiples of payoffs to coalitions, the set of all possible payoffs to players
equals {pR(S)| p ∈ IR, S ∈ A}. By %i we denote the preference relation of player i ∈ N . For some
stochastic payoffs X and Y we write X %i Y if the player weakly prefers receiving the stochastic payoff
X to receiving Y while X i Y means that player i strictly prefers X to Y . If X %i Y and Y %i X then
we write X ∼i Y , the player is indifferent between receiving X or Y . We make the following assumption
about how a player compares two payoffs.
Assumption 2.1 For each player i ∈ N there exist functions f iS : IR → IR, S ∈ A, that are surjective,
continuous and strictly monotone increasing, such that
1. f iS(t)R(S) %i f
i
T (t
′)R(T ) if and only if t ≥ t′,
2. f iS(0) = 0
for any coalitions S and T in A.
Hence, preferences are defined locally since a player’s preference relation is only defined on multiples of
coalitional payoffs in the game. This kind of preferences is particularly suitable for our model, which
will be presented in the next section. So, if player i compares the payoffs pR(S) and qR(T ) then
pR(S) %i qR(T ) if and only if t = (f iS)
−1(p) ≥ t′ = (f iT )−1(q). Similarly pR(S) ∼i qR(T ) if and only if
(f iS)
−1(p) = (f iT )
−1(q) and pR(S) i qR(T ) if and only if (f iS)−1(p) > (f iT )−1(q). One may interpret the
function (f iS)
−1 as some kind of utility function with respect to multiples of R(S) only. The condition
f iS(0) = 0 is a normalization condition.
A second implication of assumption 2.1 is that R(S) i 0 for all S ∈ A because R(S) = 1 · R(S) i
0 · R(S) = 0 if and only if t > t′ where 1 = f iS(t) and 0 = f iS(t′) ⇔ t′ = 0. This is true because f iS is
monotone increasing. Similarly it follows that
pR(S) i 0 ⇔ p > 0
pR(S) ∼i 0 ⇔ p = 0
pR(S) ≺i 0 ⇔ p < 0.
(1)
The following example presents some preference relations that satisfy assumption 2.1.
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Example 2.2 The first type of preferences we discuss here concerns expected values of random vari-
ables. Suppose that the preferences of player i are such that X %i Y if and only if E(X) ≥ E(Y ) for
any payoffs X and Y , where E(X) is the expectation of X. Then f iS(t) = t/E(R(S)) makes sure that






This is a special kind of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. Player i is said to have von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences if there exists a utility function ui : IR → IR such that X %i Y if and only if
E(ui(X)) ≥ E(ui(Y )) for any X and Y . For the preferences above we have ui(x) = ax + b with a > 0.
If ui(x) =
√
x if x ≥ 0 and ui(x) = −
√





, t ≥ 0
− t2
E(ui(R(S)))2
, t < 0
which is a nonlinear function.
A second type of preferences involves quantiles of random variables. Let
uXβi = sup{t ∈ IR|Pr{X ≤ t} ≤ βi}
be the βi-quantile of X, where 0 < βi < 1 is such that u
R(S)
βi
> 0 for all S ∈ A. Define the utility
function Ui by Ui(X) = uXβi if E(X) ≥ 0 and Ui(X) = u
X
1−βi otherwise. We say that a player has




Since the preference relation %i is complete, it is reflexive, transitive and monotone increasing. Besides,
∼i is an equivalence, and because of monotonicity, each equivalence class contains exactly one multiple
of any nonzero coalitional value. Hence, a third consequence of assumption 2.1 is that for all players
i ∈ N there exists a unique number α ∈ IR such that pR(S) ∼i αR(T ) where S, T ∈ A and p ∈ IR. To be
able to keep track of which α is connected to which variables pR(S), R(T ) and i we define the function
αi : A × A × IR → IR to take this unique value. One might say that the function αi embeds pR(S) in




function αi will be restricted to the case where i ∈ S ⊂ T because a player does not have to consider
payoffs from coalitions to which he does not belong. Further, S ⊂ T is not a real restriction because
αi(T, S, p) is the inverse of αi(S, T, p). Hence, the embedding function αi gives a complete description
of the preference relation of player i.
What happens if R(T ) = 0 for some coalition T? For all nonzero payoffs pR(S) it holds by (1) that
either pR(S) i 0 or pR(S) ≺i 0. Because αR(T ) = 0 for any α ∈ IR it follows that for all i ∈ N there
exists no α ∈ IR such that pR(S) ∼i αR(T ). But 0 · R(S) ∼i R(T ) and qR(T ) = 0 = R(T ). To cover
these two cases, we extend the domain of αi and define, if R(T ) = 0, αi(S, T, 0) = 1 and αi(T, T, q) = 1.
The next theorem states some nice properties of the function αi.
Theorem 2.3 For all i ∈ N
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1. αi(S, S, h) = h for any h ∈ IR, S ∈ A,
2. αi(T,U, αi(S, T, p)) = αi(S, U, p) for any p ∈ IR and S, T, U ∈ A,
3. αi(S, T, p) = pαi(S, T, 1) for any p ∈ IR and S, T ∈ A if the functions f iS and f iT are linear.
Proof. For the first item, let h ∈ IR and S ∈ A, then hR(S) ∼i αi(S, S, h)R(S) by definition of αi.
Because %i is monotone increasing, we have h = αi(S, S, h).
To prove the second item, let p ∈ IR and S, T, U ∈ A. Then by definition of αi pR(S) ∼i αi(S, T, p)R(T )
and αi(S, T, p)R(T ) ∼i αi(T,U, αi(S, T, p))R(U). Since %i is transitive, pR(S) ∼i αi(T,U, αi(S, T, p))R(U).
Hence, αi(T,U, αi(S, T, p)) = αi(S, U, p) because %i is also monotone increasing.
Finally, let p ∈ IR and S, T ∈ A. If the functions f iS and f iT are linear then
αi(S, T, p) = f iT ((f
i
S)




= pαi(S, T, 1),
which concludes the proof. 2
To conclude we would like to remark that any TU game (N, v) with nonnegative values can be embedded
into the framework introduced in this section. The deterministic coalition values imply that f iS(t) =
t/v(S) for v(S) 6= 0 and consequently αi(S, T, p) = pv(S)/v(T ) where v(T ) 6= 0. Notice that an
allocation x of v(N) 6= 0 among the players, where player i receives xi, is equivalent to player i receiving
the multiple pi = xi/v(N) of the total payoff v(N).
3 The model
In this section we will describe our model in more detail. We define the corresponding games where
coalitions of players receive random values. After this we extend some basic definitions in cooperative
game theory to our model and illustrate these concepts with an example.
The tuple (N,R,A, α) gives an extensive description of a cooperative game with random payoffs where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the player set, R = {R(S)|S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅} is the set of coalitional payoffs, A contains
the coalitions with a nonzero payoff and α = (αi)i∈N with αi the previously defined function derived
from the random payoffs and preference relations that describes what multiple of one stochastic variable
player i finds equivalent to another stochastic variable. Often, we will denote a game by (N,α) if R
and A follow from the context, and sometimes we simply write (α).
We will now extend various notions from deterministic TU games to cooperative games with random
payoffs. Recall from the previous section that p ∈ IRS describes an allocation for coalition S where
player i receives a multiple pi of its random payoff R(S). Such an allocation is efficient if p ∈ ∆∗(S) =
{p ∈ IRS |
∑
i∈S pi = 1}. An allocation p for coalition S is individual rational if pi ≥ αi({i}, S, 1) for all
players i ∈ S. We will denote the set of all efficient individual rational allocations for coalition S by
IR(S).
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An allocation for coalition N is called an imputation if it is individual rational and efficient. The
imputation set I(N,α) is the set of all imputations.
I(N,α) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N) | pi ≥ αi({i}, N, 1) for all i ∈ N }
Note that I(N,α) = IR(N). Depending upon the random values of the various coalitions we can say
something more about the structure of the imputation set.
Lemma 3.1 I(N,α) ⊂ {p ∈ ∆∗(N)| pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N} if N ∈ A. If N /∈ A and {i} /∈ A for all
i ∈ N , then I(N,α) = ∆∗(N). If N /∈ A and {i} ∈ A for some i ∈ N , then I(N,α) = ∅.
Proof. Assume that N ∈ A. If I(N,α) = ∅ then we are done. Otherwise take an imputation p. Then
pi ≥ αi({i}, N, 1) ≥ 0 where the second inequality follows from N ∈ A. The two remaining statements
are trivial. 2
The game (N,α) is superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅, and for all allocations
p ∈ IR(S) and q ∈ IR(T ) there exists an allocation r ∈ ∆∗(S ∪ T ) for the joint coalition such that all
players are weakly better off:{
ri ≥ αi(S, S ∪ T, pi) for all i ∈ S,
ri ≥ αi(T, S ∪ T, qi) for all i ∈ T.
Notice that r ∈ IR(S ∪ T ). So, if a game is superadditive then the members of two disjoint coalitions
can (weakly) improve upon their payoffs by cooperating. We also could have formulated superadditivity
with k ≥ 2 disjoint coalitions: for all T1, T2, . . . , Tk ⊂ N , k ≥ 2, such that Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for all i 6= j, and
for all pi ∈ IR(Ti), i = 1, 2, . . . , k there exists an allocation r ∈ ∆∗(∪ki=1Ti) such that
rj ≥ αj(Ti,∪ki=1Ti, pij) for all j ∈ Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. (2)
Again, all players are weakly better off by joining ∪ki=1Ti. Obviously, this alternative definition implies
superadditivity. The other way around is also true, as one can easily verify. This implies the following
relation between superadditive games and the sets IR(S) of individual rational allocations.
Lemma 3.2 If a game (N,α) is superadditive then IR(S) 6= ∅ for all coalitions S.
Proof. Let the game (N,α) be superadditive and take a coalition S ⊂ N . Assume S = {1, . . . , s}
and define Ti = {i} for i = 1, . . . , s. Then IR(Ti) = IR({i}) and ∪si=1Ti = S. By (2) there exists an
allocation r ∈ ∆∗(S) such that ri ≥ αi({i}, S, 1) for all i ∈ S. Thus r ∈ IR(S). 2
For all coalitions S, the set dom(S) contains the allocations for coalition N that are dominated by
coalition S, i.e., there exists an allocation q ∈ ∆∗(S) that is strictly preferred by all members of S:
dom(S) =
{
p ∈ IRS | ∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : αi(S, N, qi) > pi for all i ∈ S
}
The set of allocations that are not dominated by some coalition can take many forms, depending upon
the random values. Let pS = {pi}i∈S be the restriction of p ∈ IRN to coalition S.
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Lemma 3.3 Let S be a coalition. Then
pS /∈ dom(S) ⇔
{
p ∈ IRN if S /∈ A and N /∈ A,
pi ≥ 0 for some i ∈ S if S /∈ A and N ∈ A.
If S ∈ A and N /∈ A then pS ∈ dom(S) for all p ∈ IRN . Furthermore, if S ∈ A, N ∈ A and f iS and f iN
are linear then the set {p ∈ IRN | pS /∈ dom(S)} is convex.
Proof. We only prove the last statement. The remaining parts of the lemma are trivial.
Let (N,α) be a cooperative game with random payoffs and let S be a coalition. Assume that S ∈ A and
N ∈ A. Then pS /∈ dom(S) if and only if there exists no vector q ∈ ∆∗(S) such that αi(S, N, qi) > pi
for all i ∈ S. By property 3 in theorem 2.3 this is equivalent to
¬∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : qiαi(S, N, 1) > pi for all i ∈ S,
so,
¬∃q ∈ ∆∗(S) : qi > pi/αi(S, N, 1) for all i ∈ S.
Hence,∑
i∈S
pi/αi(S, N, 1) ≥ 1.
Define h ∈ IRS by hi = 1/αi(S, N, 1). Then hi > 0 for all i ∈ S and pS /∈ dom(S) if and only if∑
i∈S hipi ≥ 1. We conclude that the set {p ∈ IR
N | pS /∈ dom(S)} is convex. 2
The core of (N,α), denoted by C(N,α), consists of all payoff vectors attainable for the grand coalition
that are not dominated by any coalition S, that is
C(N,α) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N) | pS /∈ dom(S) for all coalitions S } .
Because the equivalence
pi /∈ dom({i}) ⇔ pi ≥ αi({i}, N, 1)
holds for all i ∈ N , the core is a subset of the imputation set: C(N,α) ⊂ I(N,α), for all games (N,α).
In particular, C(N,α) = I(N,α) for two-person games. Using the results in the lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 we
can show that the core is convex if all the functions f iS are linear for all players i.
Theorem 3.4 Let (N,α) be a cooperative game with random payoffs where all the functions f iS are
linear. Then the core C(N,α) is a convex set.
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Proof. Let undom(S) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N)| pS /∈ dom(S)} be the set of efficient allocations for N that are
not dominated by coalition S. Then
I(N,α) = ∩i∈N undom({i})
and this implies that





Firstly, suppose that N /∈ A. If S ∈ A for some S ⊂ N then undom(S) = ∅ according to lemma 3.3 and
by this C(N,α) = ∅. If S /∈ A for all S ⊂ N then according to the same theorem undom(S) = ∆∗(N)
for all S ⊂ N and so C(N,α) = ∆∗(N), which is a convex set.
Secondly, if N ∈ A then undom({i}) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N)| pi ≥ αi({i}, N, 1)} is a convex set for all i ∈ N
and so is I(N,α). If S /∈ A for some coalition S then undom(S) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N)| pi ≥ 0 for some i ∈ S}
according to lemma 3.3 and by lemma 3.1 it follows that undom(S) ⊃ I(N,α). This implies that
undom(S) ∩ I(N,α) = I(N,α), which is a convex set. If S ∈ A then it follows from lemma 3.3 that
undom(S) is a convex set. We conclude that also in case N ∈ A it holds that C(N,α) is a convex set.
2
A bijection σ of the players in N is a function from {1, 2, . . . , n} to N and σ(i) denotes which player in
N is at position i. Let Π(N) be the set of all bijections of N . Denote by Sσi = {σ(k)| k ≤ i} the set
of the first i players according to bijection σ, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and let Sσ0 = ∅. In a deterministic TU
game (N, v) the marginal vector mσ(v) is defined by
mσσ(k)(v) = v(S
σ




for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
In cooperative games with random payoffs marginal vectors can be defined in a similar way. For this
we need the following assumption.
Assumption 3.5 If T /∈ A for some coalition T then S /∈ A for all coalitions S ⊂ T .
Let yσσ(i)(α) be the marginal contribution of the ith player according to the bijection σ in the game
(N,α). Such a contribution is expressed as a multiple of the random payoff for Sσi . Now, the marginal
contribution of the first player according to σ, i.e., σ(1), equals this player’s random payoff, so yσσ(1)(α) =
1. If the second player, σ(2), joins then the two players together form the coalition Sσ2 . The marginal
contribution of σ(2) is all that remains of the random payoff of Sσ2 after deduction of the marginal
contribution of player σ(1):








The latter expression is well-defined according to assumption 3.5. Notice that this marginal contribution























for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then the marginal vector mσ(α) is defined by
mσσ(i)(α) = ασ(i)(S
σ
i , N, y
σ
σ(i)(α))
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and so, this marginal vector is an efficient allocation for N . Based on these marginal







just like its counterpart for deterministic TU-games (cf. Shapley (1953)). To conclude this section, we
give an example of a game that illustrates the concepts introduced in this section.
Example 3.6 Consider the following situation with three players, N = {1, 2, 3}. Let R(S) = max{E−∑




300 with probability 1/2
400 1/4,
and d1 = 200, d2 = 180 and d3 = 100. Notice that R(N) = E. The preference relations of the players are
as follows. For player 1 X %1 Y if and only if E(X) ≥ E(Y ). Hence, α1(S, T, p) = pE(R(S))/E(R(T )).
The players 2 and 3 have quantile preferences, as defined in example 2.2, with β2 = 0.75 and β3 = 0.9.






for i = 2, 3. The set of individual rational allocations is
I(N,α) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N)| p1 ≥ 2/15, p2 ≥ 1/4, p3 ≥ 1/20}








The six marginal vectors are given in the table below.
σ mσ(α)
(1, 2, 3) (2/15, 3/5, 4/15)
(1, 3, 2) (2/15, 1/2, 11/30)
(2, 1, 3) (4/9, 1/4, 11/36)
(2, 3, 1) (1/2, 1/4, 1/4)
(3, 1, 2) (4/11, 129/220, 1/20)
(3, 2, 1) (1/2, 9/20, 1/20)
The first two marginal vectors only belong to the imputation set while the remaining four are con-
tained in the core. The Shapley value φ(α) is the average of these marginal values and equals φ(α) =
(1027/2970, 29/66, 29/135). 2
4 Three types of convexity
The following three statements about a deterministic TU game (N, v) are equivalent (cf. Shapley
(1971) and Ichiishi (1981)).
i. For all U ⊂ N and for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ U it holds that v(S ∪ U)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ U)− v(T ).
ii. For all i ∈ N and for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i} it holds that v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ).
iii. All n! marginal vectors mσ of (N, v) belong to the core C(v).
A game (N, v) that satisfies these statements is called a convex game. Based on these statements we
define three types of convexity for cooperative games with random payoffs.
Similar to Suijs and Borm (1999), statement i can be interpreted as follows. The marginal contribution
of coalition U to coalition S, v(S∪U)−v(S), is smaller than the contribution of U to T , v(T ∪U)−v(T ).
Thus, when allocations of v(S), v(T ) and v(S ∪ U) are proposed and if coalition S is willing to let U
join, that is, the members of S get from v(S ∪ U) at least as much as what they get from v(S), then
there exists an allocation of v(T ∪ U) that makes all players in T ∪ U better off. The players in T get
at least as much from v(T ∪ U) as from v(T ) and the players in U get at least as much from v(T ∪ U)
as from v(S ∪U). If we take into account that players will only consider individual rational allocations,
then we can define a first kind of convexity as follows.
A cooperative game with random payoffs is called coalitional-merge convex if and only if for all coalitions
U , for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \U such that S 6= T , for all p ∈ IR(S), for all q ∈ IR(T ) and for all r ∈ IR(S ∪U)
such that ri ≥ αi(S, S ∪ U, pi) for all i ∈ S, there exists an allocation s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪ U) such that{
si ≥ αi(T, T ∪ U, qi) for all i ∈ T,
si ≥ αi(S ∪ U, T ∪ U, ri) for all i ∈ U.
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If we restrict ourselves to U = {i} for all i ∈ N then we arrive at a second type of convexity, which is
related to statement ii. A cooperative game with random payoffs is called individual-merge convex if
and only if for all i ∈ N , for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i} such that S 6= T , for all p ∈ IR(S), for all q ∈ IR(T )
and for all r ∈ IR(S ∪ {i}) such that rj ≥ αj(S, S ∪ {i}, pj) for all j ∈ S, there exists an allocation
s ∈ ∆∗(T ∪ {i}) such that{
sj ≥ αj(T, T ∪ {i}, qj) for all j ∈ T,
si ≥ αi(S ∪ {i}, T ∪ {i}, ri).
Finally, we call a cooperative game with random payoffs marginal convex if and only if all its marginal
vectors mσ belong to its core. This provides sufficient conditions for the Shapley value to belong to the
core.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N,α) be a marginal convex game where all the functions f iS are linear. Then the
Shapley value belongs to the core C(N,α).
Proof. According to theorem 3.4 the core C(N,α) is a convex set. Because all the marginal vectors
belong to the core, so does their average, the Shapley value. 2
If we consider other types of preferences then this result need not hold, as is shown in the next example.
Example 4.2 Consider the game (N,α) with N = {1, 2, 3},
αi(S, T, p) =

0, |S| = 1,
p, |S| = |T | > 1,
2
5p, |S| = 2, T = N,
for i = 1, 3 and
α2(S, T, p) =

0, |S| = 1,
p, |S| = |T | > 1,
2





p, |S| = 2, T = N, p ≥ 0.




∣∣∣∣∣ p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥ 0, p3 ≥ 0, 5p1 + 128(p2)6 ≥ 2,5p1 + 5p3 ≥ 2, 128(p2)6 + 5p3 ≥ 2
}
,
consists of two disjoint sets in ∆∗(N). It contains all the marginal vectors and therefore this game is
marginal convex. Nevertheless, the Shapley value φ(α) = (19/60, 11/30, 19/60) is not an element of the
core since it belongs to both dom({1, 2}) and dom({2, 3}). 2
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From the definitions it follows immediately that a coalitional-merge convex game is superadditive. If
there exists a coalition S such that IR(S) = ∅ then the game (N,α) is not superadditive by lemma 3.2
and hence it is not coalitional-merge convex. The following theorem states a similar result with respect
to marginal convexity.
Theorem 4.3 If there exists a coalition S with IR(S) = ∅ then the game (N,α) is not marginal convex.
Proof. Recall that
IR(S) = {p ∈ ∆∗(S)|pi ≥ αi({i}, S, 1) for all i ∈ S} .
Let S be a coalition with IR(S) = ∅ such that IR(T ) 6= ∅ for all subsets T of S. Note that S should
contain at least two players since IR({i}) = {1} 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N . Without loss of generality assume
that S = {1, 2, . . . , s}. Let σ be a bijection of N such that σ(i) = i. Recall that the marginal vector
mσ(α) is defined by
mσσ(j)(α) = ασ(j)(S
σ
j , N, y
σ
σ(j)(α)) (3)











Now, if yσj (α) < αj({j}, Sσj , 1) for some j < s then mσj (α) < αj({j}, N, 1) because of (3). Thus
mσ(α) /∈ I(N,α). Otherwise, if yσj (α) ≥ αj({j}, Sσj , 1) for all j < s then IR(S) = ∅ implies that
yσs (α) < αs({s}, S, 1). From equation (3) we obtain, once again, that mσ(α) /∈ I(N,α). Consequently,
mσ(α) /∈ C(N,α) since I(N,α) ⊃ C(N,α). We conclude that this game is not marginal convex. 2
Notice that this theorem is similar to lemma 3.2 about superadditivity. For two-person games marginal
convexity and superadditivity coincide. But for games with at least three players there seems to be
no relation between the concepts. It is easy to find an example of a game that is superadditive and
not marginal convex. But a game that is marginal convex and not superadditive has not yet been
found. An alternative approach is to see whether the implication series convexity ⇒ total balancedness
⇒ superadditivity holds, as it does for TU games. The first implication is shown in theorem 4.5.
Unfortunately the second implication does not hold. To see this, consider the 3-person game (N,α)
with N = {1, 2, 3} and
αi(S, T, p) =

0, |S| = 1, S 6= T
p, S = T,
1
2p, S = {1, 2}, T = N,
8+i
10 p, S = {1, 3}, T = N,
1
5p, S = {2, 3}, T = N,
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for player i ∈ N . This game has a nonempty core, and so have all of its subgames, but it is not
superadditive. The definition of superadditivity fails for the allocations p = 1 ∈ IR({2}) and q =
(0, 1) ∈ IR({1, 3}). Thus it remains open whether a marginal convex game is superadditive or not.
Our definitions of convexity are not equivalent for cooperative games with random payoffs, while the
corresponding notions are equivalent for deterministic TU games. The relations between the three






The latter relation, individual-merge convex games are marginal convex, is shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4 Let (N,α) be a cooperative game with random payoffs. If it is individual-merge convex
then it is marginal convex.
Proof. Let (N,α) be an individual-merge convex game and take a bijection σ ∈ Π(N). Without loss
of generality assume that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, let zσ,k(α) be an efficient allocation for
coalition {1, . . . , k} = Sσk defined by z
σ,k






i (α)) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Notice that zσ,n(α) = mσ(α). We show that zσ,k(α) is a core-element of the subgame Γk with player
set Sσk by induction on k.
If k = 1 then it is clear that zσ,1(α) ∈ C(Γ1). Next, assume that zσ,k(α) ∈ C(Γk) for k = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1
where l ≤ n. We have to prove that zσ,l(α) ∈ C(Γl). Consider a coalition S ⊂ Sσl−1. Then it follows from
zσ,l−1(α) ∈ C(Γl−1) and zσ,lj (α) = αj(Sσl−1, Sσl , z
σ,l−1
j (α)) for all j ∈ Sσl−1 that {z
σ,l
j (α)}j∈S /∈ dom(S).
Thus, coalition S has no incentives to leave the coalition Sσl because it cannot improve upon {z
σ,l
j (α)}j∈S .
Next, we show that also the coalition S ∪ {l} has no incentive to leave the coalition Sσl if zσ,l(α) is
allocated. Let p ∈ IR(S) be such that
∑
j∈S αj(S, S ∪ {l}, pj) is minimized. This particular allocation
is well defined since IR(S) is a compact set and
∑
j∈S αj(S, S ∪ {l}, pj) is a continuous function in p.
Define rj = αj(S, S ∪ {l}, pj) then rl := 1 −
∑
j∈S rj is as large as possible. So, the allocation r is the
best allocation for player l when cooperating with coalition S. Since the game (N,α) is individual-merge
convex there exists an allocation s ∈ ∆∗(Sσl−1 ∪ {l}) = ∆∗(Sσl ) such that{
sj ≥ αj(Sσl−1, Sσl , z
σ,l−1
j (α)) = z
σ,l
j (α), for j ∈ Sσl−1,
sl ≥ αl(S ∪ {l}, Sσl , rl).
Thus
zσ,ll (α) = 1−
∑
j∈Sσl−1
zσ,lj (α) ≥ 1−
∑
j∈Sσl−1
sj = sl ≥ αl(S ∪ {l}, Sσl , rl).
But we stated before that r is the best allocation for player l when cooperating with coalition S.
Therefore there exists no individual rational allocation for coalition S∪{l} that yields player l a strictly
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better payoff then zσ,ll (α). Hence, coalition S ∪ {l} has no incentive to part company with coalition S
σ
l
if zσ,l(α) is allocated. Consequently, we have that zσ,l(α) ∈ C(Γl). Taking l = n results in mσ(α) =
zσ,n(α) ∈ C(Γn) = C(N,α). 2
For deterministic convex games it is well known that each of its subgames is convex and consequently
has a nonempty core. A similar result can be derived for games with random payoffs.
Theorem 4.5 Let (N,α) be a cooperative game with random payoffs. If it is marginal convex then so
are all of its subgames.
Proof. Let T be a coalition and consider the bijection σ′ ∈ Π(T ). Take σ ∈ Π(N) such that the players
in T are first and in the same order as in σ′, i.e. σ′(i) = σ(i) for i = 1, . . . , |T |. These identical orders
imply
mσi (α) = αi(T,N, m
σ′
i (α)) for all i ∈ T, (4)
the marginal contributions are equivalent. Because the game (N,α) is marginal convex mσ(α) ∈
C(N,α). This means that there exists no coalition S ⊂ N such that mσ(α) ∈ dom(S). Since T ⊂ N
the previous statement also holds for all S ⊂ T . In other words, for all coalitions S ⊂ T there exists no
vector q ∈ ∆∗(S) such that for all players i in S
αi(S, N, qi) > mσi (α) = αi(T,N, m
σ′
i (α)) ⇔ αi(S, T, qi) > mσ
′
i (α)
where (4) is used. Therefore mσ
′
(α) /∈ dom(S) for any coalition S ⊂ T . We conclude that mσ′(α) ∈
C(T, α) 2
An immediate consequence of this theorem is that any marginal convex game and all of its subgames
have a nonempty core.
For two-person games all three types of convexity are equivalent. In particular it holds that marginal
convex games are individual-merge convex. The following example shows that this need not hold for
games with three or more players. Because coalitional-merge convex games are by definition individual-
merge convex, it follows immediately from the next example that a marginal convex game also need not
be coalitional-merge convex.
Example 4.6 Consider the game (N,α) with N = {1, 2, 3}, αi({i}, T, p) = 0 and the values αi(S, N, p)
for various i and S are given in the table below.



















Figure 1: Marginal vectors and the core.
The core of this game equals
C(N,α) = {p ∈ ∆∗(N)|pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N,
6p1 + 10p2 ≥ 3, 6p1 + 14p3 ≥ 2, 10p2 + 14p3 ≥ 6}.
In figure 1 this core and all marginal vectors are shown. As can be seen, all marginal vectors belong to
the core. Hence, this game is marginal convex.
This game is not individual-merge convex. To show this, take i = 1, S = {2} and T = {2, 3}. Further,
let p = 1 ∈ IR(S), q = (1, 0) ∈ IR(T ) and r = (1, 0) ∈ IR(S ∪ {i}) = IR({1, 2}). If this game would be
individual-merge convex then there would exist an allocation s ∈ ∆∗(N) such that
s1 ≥ α1(S ∪ {i}, N, r1),
s2 ≥ α2(T,N, q2),





Figure 2 shows these inequalities. They imply that s1 + s2 + s3 ≥ 1/2 + 3/5 + 0 > 1, which is in
contradiction to s ∈ ∆∗(N). Hence, this game is not individual-merge convex. 2
By definition it holds that coalitional-merge convex games are individual-merge convex. One can easily
see that the reverse relation will hold if the game has two players. The following theorem shows the





Figure 2: Contradictory inequalities for a non-individual-merge convex game.
Theorem 4.7 Let (N,α) be a cooperative game with random payoffs and with three players. If the
game is individual-merge convex, then it is coalitional-merge convex.
Proof. Let (N,α) be a three-person game that is individual-merge convex and let U ⊂ N . If U = ∅
then the condition for coalitional-merge convexity is trivially satisfied. If |U | = 1 then U = {i} for some
i ∈ N and we are done because of the individual-merge convexity.
If |U | = 2 then |N \ U | = 1. Assume that N \ U = {i}. The conditions S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ U and S 6= T
imply that S = ∅ and T = {i}. Let q ∈ IR(T ) and r ∈ IR(U). Then q = 1.
Define S′ = ∅ and T ′ = U . Then 1 ∈ IR({i}) and r ∈ IR(T ′). By individual-merge convexity there
exists an allocation s′ ∈ ∆∗(N) such that{
s′j ≥ αj(T ′, N, rj) = αj(S ∪ U,N, rj) for all j ∈ T ′ = U
s′i ≥ αi(S′ ∪ {i}, N, 1) = αi(T,N, 1).
This way, coalitional-merge convexity is satisfied. If |U | = 3 then there is nothing to check. We conclude
that this game is coalitional-merge convex. 2
In case of four or more players, we were neither able to prove that individual-merge convex games are
coalitional-merge convex nor could we find a counterexample. Hence, at this moment it remains an
open problem.
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